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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
not absurd if the donor divests one heir in favor of others existing
at the time of the testator's death.0 The doctrine established in
National Bank of Fairmont v. Kenney, according to the foregoing
rules of construction, is thoroughly sound and justifiable.'
-EDWARD S. BOOK, JR.
HOMICIDE - RESPONSiBILiTY FOR FAILmTE TO PERFORM AF-
PIRMATiVE ACTS. - "Assuming that a woman takes the children
into the water without the assistance of pulling them into the water
by the man, but he stands by conniving to the act, (i. e. the wife's
affirmative act of drowning her children and herself) what is the
position from the standpoint of the law?" This interesting question
was propounded to the court by the jury in the recent case of Rex v.
Russell,' in which D, by his failure to act, was charged with the
murder of his wife and children. The jury returned a verdict of
manslaughter (1) as to the wife, and (2) as to the children. The
court delivered seriatum opinions, concurring in the belief that D
should be held criminally responsible for the death of the children.
As to his responsibility for the death of the wife, however, there
was total disagreement. One judge was of the opinion that the
jury verdict should remain undisturbed; the second refused to
uphold the conviction, and the third held the husband for man-
slaughter by aiding and abetting.
Merely from the standpoint of result, rather than the con-
fficting methodology of means, the case is important in reflecting
a possible recognition in the law, of a change in moral values.
real estate in fee if he survive the testator, and then, if the son die leaving
no issue surviving him, to divest him of it in order to give it back to him in
fee under the designation of heir or heirs of the testator." Welch v. Brim-
mer, qpra n. 8.
10 State Street Trust Co. v. Sampson, supra n. 3.
2 The suggestion may be offered that the testator intended to protect the
children of the devisee taking a life estate, by giving the estate to the test-
ator's only heir, remainder to the issue of the beneficiary, then on the
failure of issue of the donee, to the stock of the donee generally. But, in
West Virginia, such a result would to-day be accomplished by the simple
limitation, "A for life, remainder to the heirs of A", by reason of the
abolislunent of the Rule in Shelley's Case. Since this limitation is sufficient
to arrive at the same result as that suggested by the advocates of the rule
determining the testator's heirs at the time of his death, the deliberate
language used by the testatrix would be superfluous, unless an intent other
than that imposed by the primary construction was attributed to the testator.
1 (1933) Vict. L. R. 59.
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
Heretofore, "criminal intent" was descriptive of affirmative
"wrongful" action. Now, Rex v. RusseZl suggests that non-
feasance may result in criminal culpability, depending upon the
intensity of the relationship between the parties.' The bond of
family relationship tempts one into stretching nonfeasance into an
active misfeasance.3 But to employ such dialectic for the further-
ance of our ends, is to conceal the real issue,' namely, our desire
to sanction openly criminal responsibility in those cases where
failure to act runs counter to the grain of our current mores.
Support for this desire cannot come from the criminal law
itself, because of the paucity of precedents.! Either by direct
legislation,' or by analogy to other fields of law can such liability
be at least "rationally" justified. Mann, J., in the immediate
case, borrowed language from the sphere of torts in holding D
2POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 56: "If we must find a
fundamental idea in the common law, it is relation, not will. If the Romanist
sees all the problems in terms of the will of an actor and of the logical
implications of what he has willed and done, the common-law lawyer sees
all problems . .. . all those, indeed, in which he was not led to adopt the
Romanist's point of view in the last century .... in terms of a relation and
of the incidents in the way of reciprocal rights and duties involved in, or
reuired to give effect to that relation.
3BOHLEN, STUDIEs IN THE LAW OF TORTS 318: "On the whole, it may be
said that duties to take positive action for the benefit and protection of
others atthch only to certain relations, and are imposed only when absolutely
necessary to afford protection. Even in the case of family relationship, there
is present the will of the citizen to become a husband and a father, so that
even here relation is, in the last analysis the creature of voluntary action on
his part.
'W. W. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" (1933) 42 YLE L. J. 333.
"Nearly every discussion seems to proceed on the tacit assumption that the
supposed 'line' between the two categories has some sort of objective existence,
so to speak, and that the object is to find out, as one writer puts it, 'on
which side of the line a set of facts falls'. This way of stating the problem,
if taken literally, seems to the present writer to start off on the wrong scent,
and to divert our attention from the fact that we are thinking about the
case precisely, because there is no 'line' already in 'existence' which can
be discovered by analysis alone . . . . there is no such 'line', but rather a
'no-man's land', the points of which can be assigned by the one making the
classification either to the 'face' or to the 'background' without doing vio-
lence to 'logic' or 'reason'."
Paine's Trial has often been cited as upholding conviction for manslaugh-
ter when the nonfeasance was "gross, culpable, and wicked." See WHAtToN,
CR ainm. L&w, vol. III, p. 2082, footnote 1. A recent case, State v. Harrison,
152 At. 867 (N. J. 1931) held a servant of a railroad guilty of manslaughter
when he failed to lower the gate or give other suitable notice of the approach
of a train. This holding was despite the fact that the master was not under
a contractual duty to protect the public as a whole. It is submitted that these
cases are exceptions to the general rule.
GThe following are extracts from various codes denoting legislative stand-
ards prescribing affirmative duties to act:
DuTcH PENAL CODE, art. 450: "One who witnessing the danger of death
with which another is suddenly threatened, neglects to give or furnish him
2
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under a duty because of the family relationship.' The civil theory
of proximate causation was also applied in showing that the act
of W was neither an excuse nor an intervening cause. McArthur,
J., also employed tort language when he said: ".... the true posi-
tion is that it is sufficient if the negligence complained of is a
direct cause of the injury; it is not necessary that it should be the
cause, that is, the sole direct cause. I have no hesitation in saying
in the present case that the neglect of the prisoner to make any
effort to save his children is not too remote a cause, but may, as
a matter of law, be relied upon as a direct cause of the children's
death"'!
Other analogies point to a broadening of our concept of
affirmative duties to another. The doctrines of equitable and
promissory estoppel' are both based upon an affirmative duty to
prevent reliance on misleading conduct, whereby a third party
would be induced to change his legal relationship. Running
such assistance as he can give or procure without reasonable fear of danger
to himself or to others, is to be punished, if the deathk of the person in dis-
tress follows, by a detention of three months at most and an amende of three
hundred florins at most."
GERmAx CIVIL CODE, § 826: "One who wilfully brings about damage to
another in a manner running counter to good morals is bound to make rep-
aration to the other for damage."
INDIAN PENAL CODE, c. xviii, § 294, p. 76 (1837): "Whoever does any act
or omits what he is legally bound to do with the intention of thereby causing,
or with the knowledge that he is likely to cause the death of any person, and
does by such act or omission cause the death of any person, is said to commit
the offense of 'voluntary culpable homicide'."
LIVINGSTON, Complete Works on Criminal Jurisprudence II, 126-127 Draft
Code of Crimes and Punishments for the State of Louisana: "Homicide by
omission only, is committed by voluntarily permitting another to do an act
that must in the natural course of things cause his death, without apprising
him of the danger, if the act be involuntary, or endeavoring to prevent it if
it be voluntary. He shall be presumed to have permitted it voluntarily who
omits the necessary means of preventing the death, when he knows the danger,
and can cause it to be avoided without the danger of personal injury or
pecuniary loss."
ICf. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Byrd, 89 Miss. 308, 42 So. 286
(1906), in which the relationship of railroads to their passengers was simi-
larly stressed: "Railroads owe to their passengers the consideration and
care of common humanity, it matters not how negligent a passenger may have
been in producing the injury for which he sues. Such negligence does not
absolve the railroad from the duty which it owes to him of proper attention
after an accident shall have occurred, and if, when injured, the railroad com-
pany neglects this care, which common humanity would dictate, and by reason
of this neglect, after injury has occurred, a passenger suffers damage, he
may recover against the railroad company for its dereliction."
"Cf. Beale, Proxiaate Consequences of an Act (1920) 33 HARv. L. REV.
633, in which the term "'direct" result is used diffusely in imposing tort lia-
bility.
'2 PomERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 801-821.
"American Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts, § 90.
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counter to the fundamental necessity of contractual "privity",
the third party beneficiary doctrine also raised a new kind of
affirmative duty." Likewise, an agent has been held subject to
tort liability for his failure to act affirmatively in relation to prop-
erty under his control which may become dangerous to third per-
sons.' Even in maritime law, there appears to be an affirmative
duty on the part of a ship-owner to make all reasonable efforts to
rescue sailors who have fallen'overboard."
The result of the immediate case, seeks to give sanction to
Bentham's ideal that, -
"Every man is bound to assist those who have need of
assistance, if he can do it without exposing himself to sensible
inconvenience. This obligation is stronger in proportion as
the danger is greater for the one and the trouble of preserving
him, the less for the other' ".
-JULIUS COEN.
LANDLORD AND TENANT - NATURE OF HOLD-0VER TENANCY
- RIGHT OF DISTRESS AS AGAINST INTERVENING CHATTEL MORT-
GAGE. - T during term of lease executed chattel mortgage, which
was duly recorded, to secure a loan. At expiration of lease, T held
over under terms of original lease and without executing a new
written one. All the rent before the original lease was paid before
the expiration thereof. Landlord brings action for rent accruing
during hold-over term and claims priority over chattel mortgage.
Held: Holding over created new tenancy under Code' and hence
"Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1918) 27 YALE L. J.
1008; also (1922) 31 Y.E L. J. 489.
"Seavey, The Liability of an Agent in Tort (1916) 1 So. L. Q. 16, 26.
1BoHLEN, STUDimS iN THE LAw Op TORTS, p. 312. See also The G. W. Glenn,
4 F. Supp. 727 (1933) interpreting this liability under the Merchant's Marino
Act § 33 (46 USCA) § 688.
11 BENTHA-f, COMPLETE WoRxs (1859) 164. See. also Ames, Law and
Morals (1908) 22 HAnv. L. REv. (1908).
1 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 37, art. 6, § 5. It is submitted that this
section of the code has nothing to do with the creation of estates and deals
only with their termination. It reads as follows: "A tenancy from year to
year may be terminated by either party giving notice in writing to the other,
at least three months prior to the end of any year, of his intention to term-
inate the same." The rest of the section deals with notice to terminate and
the requisite formalities.
It is further submitted that the case of Allen v. Bartlett, 20 W. Va. 46, 19
A. L. R. 10, 46 n. (1882) which is cited in the annotated code as construing
this section did not do so in the manner stated by the court in the principal
case or in the annotated code. The only mention of this section of the code
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